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In June, 199Q, the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) submitted for
approval with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission two
insurance futures contracts, one based on health insurance and one
on automobile collision coverage. The proposed contracts would be
based on the ratio of paid losses to written premium on policies
written in a particular month. Under this proposal, information on
a sample of policies would be collected from a group of insurers
and disseminated regularly so futures traders could develop
expectations of the ultimate settlement value. The final cash
settlement on the futures would be based on the figures reported by
the insurers as of four months after the policies had expired.
In February, 1991, the CBOT set a target date of October 1,
1991, to begin trading health insurance futures. However, in
September, 1991, the CBOT announced a delay in the commencement of
trading insurance futures. This paper will describe the initial
futures contracts proposed by the CBOT, discuss the possible
benefits of a functional insurance futures market, analyze the
problems inherent in the proposed contracts and propose an
alternative contract, based on insured losses from catastrophes,
that avoids many of the problems that affected the initial
insurance futures contracts.
Futures and the CBOT
Futures contracts are an institutionalized form of forward
trading. Forward trading is simply the commitment of two parties
to engage in the purchase and sale of a good or another financial
transaction at a stated future date. Forward contracting,
particularly in agricultural commodities, can be traced to the
times of the Roman empire and classical Greece. Trading in futures
developed in the 1860s, initiated by the Chicago Board of Trade.
The distinction between futures and forward contracts is based
principally on four attributes of futures. First, futures are
traded only on an organized exchange; twelve futures exchanges are
active in the United States alone. Second, futures contracts are
standardized as to the quality of the item to be delivered as well
as the date and location of delivery. Next, a clearinghouse is
involved in every futures trade and the commitment of each party to
the trade is to the clearinghouse. The clearinghouse thus
guarantees performance of the future transaction, reducing
(eliminating, as claimed by futures exchanges) default risk. The
final major difference between futures and forward contracts is
that each day futures contracts are "marked to market". Any
changes in the value of a position are reflected in the accounts of
the traders at the end of every trading day.
Futures contracts are now traded on a variety of goods,
ranging from the agricultural commodities that gave rise to this
type of trading, to metals, petroleum, interest-bearing assets,
foreign currencies and financial indices. Futures on financial
indices, such as the Standard and Poor's 500 index, unlike more
traditional futures contracts, cannot be fulfilled by physical
delivery of the underlying commodity at expiration; instead each
trader's position is closed out by a reversing trade (e.g., selling
all contracts held prior to expiration) or by cash settlement. The
insurance futures contracts would be a form of financial index and
have this attribute. For a more detailed introduction to futures
contracts, see Kolb (1985).
The CBOT's Proposed Insurance Futures Contracts
The insurance futures contracts initially proposed by the CBOT
for health insurance and automobile collision coverage were devised
to follow the pattern of traditional financial futures contracts.
Trading would begin in the month that the policies on which the
index would be based were written. Positions would be marked to
market daily, so that every day investors' accounts would be
credited with any capital gains on their futures positions or be
debited any capital losses that occurred that day. The contract
would be based on the experience of a group of insurers on a sample
of the policies they wrote that were effective in a given month.
The final settlement value would be determined as follows four
months after the policies expired:
$100,000 * ( 1 -(Claims paid/Premiums earned))
The policy reguirements for inclusion in the health insurance
futures index included deductible levels, minimum benefits,
coinsurance provisions, group size and a twelve month policy term.
The criteria for the automobile contract included deductible level,
geographic distribution and a six month policy term. Thus, the
health insurance future would trade for sixteen months (the twelve
month policy term and four additional months for claims to be paid)
and the automobile insurance future for ten months (six month
policy term and four month settlement period) . A manager would be
appointed for each type of future to set up the pool of reporting
insurers, collect the statistical information and calculate and
disseminate the index value. Coopers and Lybrand was appointed to
manage the health insurance pool.
Each month during the policy term, the insurers will report to
the manager written premiums and paid claims on the sample of
policies included in the pool. As the index is based on policies
written in a particular month, most of the written premium will be
included in the first monthly report. Subseguent endorsements and
cancellations will affect the final written premium value, but
these changes are likely to be minor. As the index is valued four
months after the policy expires, all written premiums will have
been earned by then. Thus, a fairly good estimate of earned
premiums should be available early in the futures contract trading
period. Paid claims will also be included in the monthly reports.
As the final index value will be based on all claims that have been
paid by the insurer and reported to the pool manager by the
deadline of four months after the expiration of the policies, some
claims will not have been paid by then, and others will not have
been included in the statistical reports for one reason or another.
It is unclear whether recoveries such as salvage and subrogation
will be considered, but even if they are, the early cutoff will
limit the amount of recoveries included. Thus, the settlement
value will not be based on ultimate incurred losses, but on a
partially developed paid loss figure. Interim reports will provide
some information on the final index value, but the settlement value
will be unknown until the final values are released. It is this
uncertainty that makes this contract suitable for a futures market.
The value of the insurance futures at any point in time should
represent the market consensus of the final settlement value. For
example, if the expected value of paid claims to earned premium for
health insurance policies issued in January, 1993, is 80 percent,
then the futures contract should be priced at $20,000 [$100, 000* ( 1-
.80)]. If a flu epidemic occurred during the next twelve months,
then the consensus might change to expect a ratio of 82 percent.
This should drop the value of the futures contract to $18,000.
Because the value of an insurance futures contract would be likely
to mirror the costs of claims for individual insurers, automobile
and health insurers could use the contract as a hedging mechanism.
An insurer could protect itself from an increase in claims costs by
selling an insurance futures contract (taking a short position)
.
If a general increase in claims costs occurred, the value of the
insurance futures contract would decrease. To reflect this change
in value, the futures exchange would transfer the capital loss on
the contract from those who bought futures contracts (the longs) to
those who sold (the shorts) . This gain on the futures position
would largely offset the unfavorable loss experience on written
policies. Of course, if claims costs fell, the gain from the
written policies would be offset by a loss on the futures position.
Potential Benefits of Insurance Futures
The original CBOT insurance futures proposal fostered a number
of studies on the possible benefits of this contract. Hofflander,
et al
,
(1991) examine how the insurance market would be affected by
the availability of insurance futures and found that insurers would
be willing to sell more insurance if a market for insurance futures
existed, but the effect on prices was indeterminate. An important
aspect of the benefit of the futures market was how closely the
pool value varied in line with the insurer's own experience. The
greatest benefit occurred if the values were highly correlated.
Cox and Schwebach (1991) model the CBOT futures contract and
options on the futures, and compare the benefits of these contracts
to reinsurance. The futures are found to compare favorably to
reinsurance in some regards, specifically liguidity,
confidentiality and potentially lower transactions costs. Another
potential advantage of insurance futures is the possibility of
lowering the entry costs into the insurance business. An entity
could participate in the market without having to become a licensed
insurance carrier in various states. Also, insurance futures
could, if used properly, decrease the risk of insurer insolvency.
However, the advantages of reinsurance, surplus aid, targeting
specific geographic markets and perfect correlation with the ceding
company's book of business, may limit the use of insurance futures
by insurers.
Mann and Niehaus (1991) provide an excellent analysis of the
original CBOT insurance futures proposal and demonstrate that, if
the costs can be held low enough, then insurance futures offer the
possibility of lowering insurance prices, reducing insolvency risk,
lowering the required capital for insurers and increasing coverage
for consumers. They find that insurance futures provide risk
reduction possibilities beyond those currently available through
reinsurance. Their paper also examines the practical regulatory
issues involved in insurance futures that can be expected to impede
the implementation of these contracts.
One shortcoming of the paper by Mann and Niehaus relates to
the problem of asymmetric information between the insurers that
report the statistical information used to generate the pool index
and all other parties. In noting the potential problem of an
insurer engaging in opportunistic behavior to take advantage of
information about loss payments to profit on futures trades, they
cite the fact that no one insurer will have more than 15 percent of
the policies included in the pool and that opportunistic behavior
may be a criminal offense. However, this informational asymmetry
is a much more serious problem than recognized by Mann and Niehaus.
As elaborated later in this paper, knowledge of the type of
policies being reported to the pool, the company's monthly loss
ratio values and loss development patterns, and such seemingly
innocuous items as report cutoff dates and claims department
staffing, would provide a significant informational advantage that
is likely to doom the current CBOT insurance futures proposal. To
avoid the informational asymmetry, this paper details an
alternative insurance futures index.
A number of other articles provide insights into the insurance
futures market. Eramo (1991) describes how the CBOT proposal would
function and indicates the significant impact on the insurance
market that a successful insurance futures contract, especially one
on longer tailed liability lines, would have. Rosenthal (1991a,
1991b, 1991c) and Hayes (1991) provide upbeat analyses of the
potential of insurance futures. D'Arcy and France (1990) take a
less sanguine view of the initially proposed CBOT contract.
Sherman (1990) presents some numerical examples of how
insurance futures will function and a general description of the
futures market. Lewis (1990) points out a number of misconceptions
in Sherman's article, and these points are addressed in Sherman
(1991a). In a later paper, Sherman (1991b) attempts to explain
insurance futures to actuaries and relies on the Black-Scholes
option pricing model to determine appropriate prices. This
application of the Black-Scholes model to futures is incorrect, as
noted by Cox (1991) and Robertson (1991)
.
The general view of the literature on insurance futures is
that if an index that is highly correlated with nondiversifiable
insurance risk could be established and a low transactions cost
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insurance futures market could be maintained, then the risk
involved in writing insurance could be more widely spread and
reduced for individual insurers. This risk reduction tool would
then lower insurance prices. Most articles recognize the potential
benefits of a viable insurance futures contract.
Problems with the Initial Futures Contract Proposal
Many articles raised serious concerns about the viability of
the initially proposed CBOT contract, in terms of the feasibility
of creating the index, the correlation with insurers'
nondiversif iable risk and the transactions costs. The insurance
futures contract initially proposed by the CBOT required the
development of a new data set on which the settlement price of the
contract would be based. Thus, insurers and other futures market
participants would not know how the values related to their own
experience. With no knowledge of how the futures prices move in
relation to the other risks of the company, developing hedge ratios
and trading strategies to minimize total risk would be difficult.
The premium and loss values used to generate the insurance
futures index would be reported periodically by the pool manager
prior to the ultimate settlement value. Although insurers are
familiar with working with incomplete data in using loss
development factors to project ultimate loss experience, loss
development factors are based on historical experience. Without
historical experience, many insurers would be reluctant to
participate in insurance futures since the level of uncertainty
would be so high. Thus, the insurance futures market would have to
be functioning for several years before many potential participants
would become involved as traders. Who would trade insurance
futures in the meantime is a major concern.
Compiling the insurance futures indices for health and
automobile insurance would reguire a minimum of ten insurers for
each line to voluntarily report premium and loss information to the
pool manager on a monthly basis so that no one insurer would have
an inordinate impact on the index. Automobile insurers are already
reguired to report detailed information to statistical or
ratemaking agencies. The information reguired by the pool manager
would be a subset of this information. However, generating the new
reports would entail some expenses, especially in the initial
programming to select the policies on which premium and loss
information would be reported, as well as the ongoing computer runs
and error checking. Three problems associated with generating this
information are apparent.
First, the insurers reporting the information must be
compensated in some way. Although the initial documentation
produced by the CBOT indicated that insurers were expected to
volunteer to provide this information, evidently the CBOT later
decided to pay for this service. These payments raise the CBOT's
administrative costs for the contract.
Second, the insurers reporting the data to the pool manager
would have a significant information advantage over other traders.
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When the contract is first listed for trading, the company would
have a much better estimate of the expected loss ratio on its
business than other futures traders. Even if traders knew what
percent of the pool each reporting insurer composed, they would not
know the monthly loss ratio of the reporting insurers for months
leading up to the beginning of trading or the loss ratio on
policies with similar characteristics to the sample that is
reported. Traders would also not know the paid loss ratio as of
four months after the policies expire. Such factors as the
classification of the driver, deductible, rating territory and
length of time a policy has been insured with the reporting insurer
all affect the expected loss ratio on a book of automobile
insurance.
Even after a pattern of development has been established, the
reporting insurers would have a significant advantage over other
traders. Historical development patterns are affected by the
actual cutoff date for generating a monthly report (just before or
after a weekend, around a holiday, etc.). The reporting insurers
would know if they were understaffed compared to prior reporting
periods, causing loss payments to be made at a slower rate. Any
internal changes in claims processing, such as changing the dollar
level of settlement authority for agents or office adjusters,
adding or deleting coding reguirements, or altering the caseload of
adjusters, would affect the rate of claim payments. As the
reporting insurers would be able to trade insurance futures for
their own accounts, there would be a incentive to exploit this
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information. The fear of manipulation of the set of policies
offered and of the exploitation of private information could be
fatal to the contracts 1 success.
Finally, there are practical problems with an index which does
not have a long history. In order to use the contracts, insurers
would have to calculate the correlation between their loss
experience and the futures index in order to decide on a hedge
ratio. If there are no data with which to calculate such a
correlation, insurers would have to either wait for the data to
accumulate or guess at the correct hedge ratio. Further, there is
no reason to believe that the correlation between the paid loss
ratio on a small sample of business from selected insurers written
in one given month of the year would be highly correlated with the
full year of incurred losses the company wants to hedge. Pricing
problems of one insurer in the sample may not affect other
insurers. The experience of business written in a particular month
may not correspond with experience on business written throughout
the year.
In short, three fundamental problems are associated with
generating a new index as the basis for the insurance futures: 1)
encouraging insurers to provide information and 2) dealing with the
informational asymmetries resulting from having market participants
responsible for providing input to the index, and 3) the inability
to calculate a hedge ratio. A better alternative would be to base
the insurance futures on a pre-existing index. Such an index
should be available over a lengthy historical period, represent
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nondiversifiable risk and, to the greatest extent possible, not
provide any participant with the ability to manipulate or with
superior knowledge. The next section proposes an index that meets
these criteria.
A Catastrophe Index
The insurance futures contract proposed in this paper is based
on annual aggregate insured losses from catastrophes. The
insurance industry already collects detailed statistical
information on losses from catastrophes, so creating the index
should not be a problem. Further, insurers are already familiar
with the historical behavior of catastrophe losses. Thus, this
contract would avoid many of the problems with the initially
proposed futures problems.
Whenever a windstorm, flood, earthguake or other natural
disaster is expected to generate more than a particular level of
insurance claims (currently $5 million) , the statistical agencies
assign a catastrophe number to the event and reguire all insurers
to include this number on claims caused by this catastrophe.
Estimates are made of the total insured damages caused by each
catastrophe. Aggregate figures are published annually by the
Insurance Information Institute and other sources. Figure la
illustrates the loss payments made as a result of catastrophic
losses for the period 1949 - 1988 and Figure lb extends the results
through 1991. Including Hurricane Hugo, which generated $4.2
13
billion in insured losses in September, 1989, on the chart changes
the scale enough to reduce the visual impact of prior catastrophes.
The annual aggregate insured losses from catastrophes could
serve as an effective insurance futures index. We would exclude
losses from fires and riots from this index for reasons discussed
below, dealing only with "natural" catastrophes: hurricanes,
tornadoes, hail, ice storms and earthquakes are typical causes.
The annual aggregate insured losses from all catastrophes and from
natural catastrophes is graphed in Figure 2 . The number and
severity of natural disasters are unsystematic.
In this proposal the payoff on a catastrophe futures contract
is equal to 1/1,000 times the total insured loss payments from
natural catastrophes in each calendar year. A contract of this
size would have had an average settlement value of about $2.2
million over the period 1978 - 1991. If losses were less than
expected, the buyer of a futures contract would incur a loss; if
they were greater than expected, the buyer would have a gain.
There would be a 1993 catastrophe future, a 1994 future, etc.
Trading would commence shortly before the calendar year begins, in
mid-December, and final settlement would take place at the end of
March of the following calendar year, by which time a fairly
precise estimate of the final figure would be available, since most
claims would have been settled. Thus, the right-hand bars in
Figure 2 would illustrate the final settlement value on the futures
contract from year to year.
An insurer or reinsurer would be able to hedge against swings
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in the level of his loss payments by buying an appropriate number
of the futures contracts. In a year with heavy claims, the futures
position would show a gain which would help offset large payments
to policy holders. In a year when claims were light, the futures
contract would show a corresponding loss. Most hedgers would
probably maintain a continual hedge, switching their position to a
new contract near the start of the year. An insurer or reinsurer
could establish the number of futures needed for hedging based on
the following year's expected market shares of property insurance.
An insurer that writes 3 . 5 percent of the property insurance market
could expect to pay approximately 3.5 percent of any catastrophe
losses. By purchasing 35 catastrophe futures, any divergence from
the expected catastrophe loss experience will be approximately
offset by the investment gain or loss on the futures contract.
For instance, if catastrophe losses turned out to be $3
billion rather than $2.2 billion, the insurer's catastrophe losses
would be approximately $105 million (i.e., 3.5 percent of $3
billion) rather than $77 million (i.e., 3.5 percent of $2.2
billion) . An insurer that bought 3 5 futures contracts would gain
($3 billion - $2.2 billion) times 1/1000 per contract on each of 35
contracts, for a total of $28 million. Thus the gain on the
futures contract would tend to offset the loss due to the
catastrophe. If catastrophe losses were lower than expected, the
favorable experience would be offset by a loss on the futures
contract.
Establishing the value of the contract would be relatively
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easy. The mechanism for tracking losses from catastrophes is
already in place. When a disaster occurs which is expected to
result in more than $5 million of insured losses, it is assigned a
catastrophe number, and all insurers are reguired to report the
amount of loss payments resulting from that catastrophe. The data
are currently collected and reported by the American Insurance
Services Group, Property Claim Services Division. Since this index
is based on the reports of all insurers, it would not be easily
manipulated by any one company or individual.
Most of the disasters which are classified as catastrophes are
the result of tornadoes and hurricanes, with the latter accounting
for the most extreme losses. Both types of windstorms have
regional and seasonal patterns, tornadoes occurring most often in
the southern and central states, with hurricanes largely striking
the East coast. Tornadoes occur all year round, but are more
likely in spring and summer, while hurricanes are more freguent in
late summer and early fall. While hurricanes create the largest
individual losses, as can be seen in Figures la and lb, tornadoes
are so much more common that they represent a larger proportion of
the annual totals.
Up until 1982, a catastrophe number was assigned when insured
losses were expected to exceed $1,000,000. In 1982, this trigger
value was changed to $5,000,000. Although the trigger for
determining a catastrophe has changed, and will continue to change,
over time, knowledge of the distribution of losses would allow an
adjustment factor to be calculated for different catastrophe level
16
determinations
.
Who Would Trade?
Both speculative and hedging interest in the contract would
probably be light before the calendar year covered by the contract
begins. Insurers would use futures to hedge loss experience during
the year; prior to the beginning of the year any change in the
value of the contract would not correspond with actual losses.
Also, prior to the start of the calendar year covered, little
information about expected catastrophe losses is likely to emerge.
Though hurricanes and tornadoes are more likely at some times of
the year than at others, long range predictions of deviations from
the seasonal pattern do not seem to be reliable. Traders taking
the short side of the contract in December would have no special
information yet, but would be simply accommodating the hedgers,
possibly in exchange for a risk premium.
However, when a tropical storm forms in the Atlantic, a surge
in speculative interest should occur. The traders in the grain
pits at the Chicago Board of Trade have been assessing the impact
of weather for over a hundred years. The traders at the Citrus
Associates of the New York Cotton Exchange are so good at
predicting the temperature in Florida that there is some evidence
they can out-predict the National Weather Service forecast (Roll,
1984) . Adeguate speculative interest in a contract is considered
vital to its success, since it helps increase and maintain market
17
liquidity.
There are two parts of the insurance industry who would be
especially interested in using this contract for hedging their
risks. For an insurer, the contract would provide an alternative
to reinsurance. A long position in insurance futures would result
in an inflow of capital in years when claims are higher than usual,
and an outflow when claims are lower. Thus, for most insurers, the
futures contract would simply provide an alternative to
reinsurance. However, for the largest insurers, the reinsurance
market is not cost-effective; they currently tend to bear most of
the risk for the policies they write. If the futures market proves
to be sufficiently liquid, it might allow the largest insurers to
manage their risks in a more efficient manner.
The second group of potential hedgers are the reinsurers
themselves, discussed in detail below. First, some reinsurance
contracts pass off a proportional amount of claims from the
originator. By purchasing shares of claims from many companies,
the reinsurer can gain some geographical diversification. Small
local claims should average out. However, catastrophes typically
cover several states. Even reinsurers would experience such events
as large, undiversifiable shocks. An insurance futures contract
would enable them to partially offset such risks, if they wished.
It is precisely this type of undiversifiable risk which futures
were made to take care of: if the price of wheat rises or falls,
the shock hits the whole country.
Property insurers of all types, automobile, homeowners and
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commercial property, are affected by catastrophic losses. Insurers
that are well diversified geographically, and reinsurers, would be
likely to have loss experience that varies in line with the
national level of catastrophes in a given year. For smaller
insurers, especially those not geographically diversified, loss
experience will not be as highly correlated with the national
catastrophe level. However, for small insurers, the reinsurance
market is an effective tool for reducing risk. Insurance futures
would be an effective risk reduction tool for organizations for
which reinsurance is not as useful a tool, due to their size or
their organization.
Another factor that would help create liguidity for a market
in catastrophe futures is the fact that these catastrophes actually
benefit some segments of the economy, so they might willingly trade
the opposite position from insurers. Whereas property insurers
suffer losses when these events occur, industries such as building
supply firms and construction companies would be expected to incur
gains. Also, hedging possibilities with other futures, such as
crops also affected by the disaster, may serve to reduce overall
risk from positions in an insurance future based on this
catastrophe index.
Moral Hazard
The last thing the exchanges would want is to give someone an
incentive to cause a major disaster. To avoid moral hazard, the
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contract should be written to cover natural catastrophes only.
This would exclude from the index the few large fires and
occasional riots, which are typically a very small amount of the
total loss payments from catastrophes. As shown Figure 2, most
catastrophe losses are due to natural occurrences.
There is still some element of moral hazard in catastrophe
insurance, but only in that some losses could be avoided,
fraudulent claims could be made, or reporting could be more or less
complete. However, these reflect the moral hazard of the insured,
not the insurers. The only way an insurer would be able to benefit
by misreporting or manipulating the catastrophe index would be to
have a futures position so much in excess of its exposure to
catastrophe losses that it actually paid to do so. This unlikely
scenario could easily be prevented by setting position limits on
the contract itself, or by direct regulatory oversight. Further,
the insurance companies, which originate the statistics on which
the index would be based, are closely regulated at the state level.
Opportunities for manipulation are probably small.
Insurance Futures versus Reinsurance
The standard method for dealing with excessive risk for an
insurance company is to purchase reinsurance. In a reinsurance
contract the insurance company that wrote the original policy,
called the primary or ceding company, transfers some of that risk
to another insurance company, called the reinsurer. Some
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reinsurers do not write any primary business; they only accept
reinsurance. Other reinsurers write both primary and reinsurance
business.
Several different types of reinsurance contracts are
available. Under an excess-of-loss contract, the reinsurer pays
for any loss on an individual policy over a pre-established value,
called the primary insurer's retention level. A primary insurer
that wrote a policy with limits above the level it could
comfortably handle would reinsure the amount of loss over the
retention level. For example, a primary insurer could write a fire
insurance policy on a $2 million building, but might feel that a
fire loss of over $500,000 would affect its financial status
excessively. This insurer could purchase a $1.5 million
excess-of-loss reinsurance policy over a $500,000 retention. The
primary insurer would pay all losses under $500,000 and the first
$500,000 on any loss over the retention.
Another form of reinsurance is pro-rata reinsurance. Under
pro-rata reinsurance, the primary insurer and the reinsurer share
all losses, regardless of the size, in the same proportions. In
the example above, if a primary insurer wanted to limit its maximum
loss on the fire policy to $500,000 through pro-rata reinsurance,
it would cede 75 percent of every loss to a reinsurer. Since the
reinsurer is paying on every claim, not just the large losses,
pro-rata reinsurance is much more expensive than excess-of-loss
reinsurance. Pro-rata reinsurance is generally used to meet other
needs of the primary insurer, such as surplus relief or obtaining
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underwriting and pricing guidance from the reinsurer, in addition
to reducing the impact of a large loss.
Excess-of-loss and pro-rata reinsurance deal with claims that
arise on individual policies. Other forms of reinsurance are
available to deal with risk on the total portfolio of the primary
insurer. Aggregate excess, also termed catastrophe reinsurance,
applies to all losses an insurer incurs from any one event no
matter how many different policies are involved. If a primary
insurer purchased a $5 million aggregate excess reinsurance policy
with a $1 million retention, and one hurricane caused $3.5 million
in covered claims on 80 different policies, all the losses over the
$1 million retention would be covered by the reinsurer. However,
if the hurricane caused $7 million in losses, the reinsurer would
pay only the $5 million coverage limit.
Finally, stop-loss reinsurance provides protection against the
loss ratio of the primary insurer exceeding a predetermined level.
No matter how many different losses occur or how large the
individual claims are, the stop-loss reinsurance would begin to pay
if the loss ratio were over the set level. A primary insurer might
obtain a stop-loss reinsurance contract that started paying 80
percent of all losses when the loss ratio exceeded 85 percent.
Reinsurance is an accepted method of risk transfer for
insurers. Insurance regulators analyze the retention levels of an
insurer during financial audits and consider the financial status
of the reinsurers. In statutory accounting reinsurance recoverable
is a recognized asset. Thus, reinsurance effectively reduces the
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variability of the primary insurer's underwriting profitability.
Direct written premiums are the total premiums on all policies
that a primary insurance company writes. Reinsurance premiums,
either ceded or assumed, are not included in direct written
premium. Net written premium is equal to direct written premium
plus any reinsurance premiums written minus any reinsurance
premiums ceded. Thus, a company that buys a lot of reinsurance
would have a net written premium figure well below its direct
written premium level.
One financial value that insurance regulators monitor for
property-liability insurers is the premium to surplus ratio, which
is calculated by dividing the net written premium by the statutory
surplus of the insurer. If this ratio is above 3.0, then it is
considered unusually high. Generally, property-liability insurers
have values in the 1.5 to 2.0 range. One regulatory quick screen
of the property-liability insurance industry is termed IRIS
(Insurance Regulatory Information System) , under which a series of
financial ratios for each company is determined and the number of
unusual values tallied. If four or more unusual values occur for
an insurer, then the company is accorded greater scrutiny to
determine if a serious financial problem exists. The premium to
surplus ratio is one such test.
By purchasing reinsurance, an insurer can lower its net
written premiums and reduce the premium to surplus ratio. Thus,
reinsurance is an acceptable method for improving the financial
position of an insurer.
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The initial CBOT insurance futures contract was advanced as a
low cost alternative to reinsurance. However, the index on which
the future was to be based would, at most, be only somewhat
correlated with the loss experience of an individual insurer.
Unlike reinsurance, which is perfectly correlated with the primary
insurer's loss experience, the futures would only be an approximate
hedge for loss experience. Insurance regulators did not view
insurance futures as an acceptable alternative to reinsurance.
Investments in insurance futures were not allowed to reduce net
written premiums and reguired loss reserves would not be affected
by a position in insurance futures. This position was in part due
to the conservative nature of insurance regulation, evidenced by an
unwillingness to accept a new technigue in place of a well
established one, as well as the valid recognition that insurance
futures were a far less precise hedging mechanism than reinsurance.
The primary problem with the view that insurance futures can
be an alternative to reinsurance is the failure to recognize that
reinsurance affects the underwriting side of an insurer and
futures, insurance or otherwise, affect the investment side of
insurance. Both the dichotomy of insurance underwriting and
investment operations and the risk reducing possibilities available
by properly structuring the investment portfolio have been examined
previously [Tilley (1980) , D'Arcy (1982) , Panning (1987) , Casualty
Actuarial Society (1990) Chapter 8]. If an insurer purchases an
investment that is positively correlated with losses, then the
total risk of the insurer will be reduced. When losses are higher
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than expected, the investment will produce an above average gain;
when losses are below expectations, investment results will also be
below average. Thus, total profitability will be less volatile
under this investment strategy.
For a primary insurer, the purchase of a catastrophe future
would be similar to buying a proportional reinsurance contract on
an industry aggregate excess basis. The difference would be that
reinsurance affects underwriting results, whereas catastrophe
futures would have a risk reducing effect though investment income.
An option on a catastrophe future, which the CBOT would probably
also offer, would be similar to an excess-of-loss reinsurance
contract on an industry aggregate excess basis.
Insurers can invest in futures and options under the
regulations of most states, although the amount of such investments
are limited to a set percentage of surplus or assets. These
investments are treated similarly to an equity investment and
valued at market values for each accounting period. A future that
is correlated with insurance losses would thus be an attractive
investment opportunity for an insurer. No additional regulatory
approval, or sanction as an alternative to reinsurance, would be
necessary.
How Good a Hedge?
An insurance futures contract is only useful if the value of
the contract tracks closely the risk to be hedged. Though
catastrophe futures have many desirable properties, insurer losses
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from catastrophes do not represent a high proportion of the total
losses to insurers. They can still represent a useful hedge,
however, if changes in the futures contract value are closely
correlated with changes in the profitability of insurers.
We have identified two groups of insurers who would seem
likely to benefit from a catastrophe futures contract, large
insurance companies and reinsurers. Large insurance companies are
poorly served by the reinsurance market because of the size of
their exposures, but might be able to benefit from insurance
futures if the market were sufficiently liguid.
Reinsurers might be also be able to use insurance futures to
hedge themselves. First, since pro-rata reinsurance involves
holding a portion of a large number of contracts, reinsurers 1 loss
experience is likely to correlate relatively closely with the
overall catastrophe record. Second, aggregate excess reinsurance
leaves the reinsurer exposed to catastrophic type losses. For
these contracts, catastrophe futures are an even more obvious
hedge. The correlation between the reinsurance contract's
profitability and total losses on catastrophes should be high,
which would make the futures contract a good hedging instrument.
Empirical Results
As mentioned previously, insurance claims paid in catastrophic
losses are tabulated by the Property Claim Service Division of the
American Insurance Services Group and cited in various sources,
26
including Insurance Facts , published annually by the Insurance
Information Institute. Although these values are only estimates of
insured losses, they represent reasonable approximations of the
cost to insurers of catastrophic losses. This information has been
compiled for over 40 years, so a significant loss history is
already in existence.
The types of natural disasters that tend to cause significant
insurance losses include wind, hail, tornadoes, earthquakes, floods
and blizzards. These losses are covered under property insurance
policies, which are reported as a number of different lines of
insurance in financial reports. Each line would also include other
types of losses. This study considers the major lines under which
catastrophe losses would fall: Fire, Allied Lines, Homeowners and
Commercial Multi-Peril.
In addition to natural disasters, fires can also be of
catastrophic proportions. For example, the brush fires in the San
Francisco area in October, 1991, were estimated to have caused $1.2
billion in insured losses, second only to Hurricane Hugo in overall
size. However, fires are excluded from our measure of natural
disasters to reduce moral hazard in trading catastrophe futures.
Otherwise, an investor holding a long position in catastrophe
futures might be tempted to set a major fire to increase the value
of the futures.
Statutory underwriting profit margins from Best's Aggregates
and Averages for stock insurers and mutual insurers and for the
largest primary insurers were obtained for the period 1960-1990 for
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each of these lines of business. The effect of catastrophes on
smaller insurers is expected to be less than on the largest
insurers as small insurers would purchase reinsurance to reduce the
impact of catastrophic losses. The largest insurers tend to retain
all or most of the catastrophe losses.
The catastrophe losses occurring annually from natural
disasters are deflated to remove the impact of inflation. The
deflated values still exhibit an upward trend, likely the impact of
increasing insured property values in at risk localities, such as
coastal areas [ISO (1990)]. A line fitted to the deflated
catastrophes, as shown on Figure 3, has a significant positive
coefficient.
In 1989 natural disasters, led by hurricane Hugo, caused $7.6
billion in insured losses, a value significantly higher than the
trend of the prior 38 years would have indicated. In 1990, insured
losses from natural disasters totaled $2.8 billion, a value as high
as any prior year other than 1989. Whether these values portend a
new level of losses or are simply outliers is difficult to tell at
this point. However, to prevent these unusually large values from
distorting the calculations, all the analyses are run for the
period 1960-1988 and for 1960-1990.
Using the trended value of natural disasters as the "normal"
catastrophe loading, any deviation from this level would be
expected to impact underwriting profitability. If the actual level
of catastrophes is less than the trended level, underwriting
profitability should increase. A higher level of catastrophes
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would translate into reduced profitability.
The impact of catastrophes is measured against underwriting
profitability, rather than simply incurred losses, due to the
downward trend of underwriting expenses over the time period of
this study. Insurers have lowered commissions and become more
efficient in other expense areas over the period of this study, and
insurers with lower expense ratios have gained market share. For
example, in 1960 the all lines expense ratio for stock insurers was
34.8 percent; by 1988 this ratio had fallen to 27.8 percent. As
lower expenses allow insurers to operate profitably at higher loss
ratios, the underwriting profit margin is a more valid measure of
deviation from expected results than only changes in the loss
ratio.
The correlations of underwriting profitability for Fire,
Allied Lines, Homeowners and Commercial Multi-Peril for all stock
insurers, all mutual insurers and for the largest primary insurers
are reported in Table 1. Roughly half (25 of 40 for 1960-1988 and
19 of 40 for 1960-1990) of the correlations are significant at the
5 percent level. Allied Lines, Homeowners and Commercial
Multi-Peril tend to have significant correlations, but Fire
Insurance, despite the fact the extended coverage endorsement
provides windstorm coverage, does not. A similar pattern exists
for most large insurers.
The insignificant values for Fire could be the result of
excluding fire catastrophes, or from expense ratio anomalies. The
Fire insurance expense ratio for mutual insurers did move
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unexpectedly. For example, in 1985 the ratio was 24.9 percent and
in 1986, 48.4 percent. For individual insurers low correlations
could be the result of reinsurance contracts that dampen the effect
of catastrophic losses, the occurrence of large, company specific
disasters or expense ratio movements. Communications with one
large insurer in the sample, Liberty Mutual, indicated that expense
ratio fluctuations could not be reasonably explained and their
Allied Lines book of business was small enough to be severely
impacted by individual losses. Another explanation could be the
relatively minor impact of catastrophic losses on some lines that
cover many perils. For example, Homeowners and Commercial
Multi-Peril cover liability in addition to property losses.
Liability losses, especially for CMP, could dwarf the impact of
property loss fluctuations caused by catastrophes. Also, the long
tailed nature of liability claims increases the impact of interest
rate changes on the acceptable underwriting profit margin for an
insurer. The general upward trend of interest rates over the
period studied, as well as interest rate cycles, create an
additional distortion to the underwriting profit margin.
Reinsurers' experience is also expected to be affected by
catastrophic losses, and to a greater extent than primary insurers.
However, accounting for reinsurance transactions does not always
follow the same line of business allocations as the primary policy
represents. The analysis of the correlation of reinsurers'
underwriting profitability with the deviation from trended
catastrophes, as shown in Table 2, shows a negative, but
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insignificant, effect for most reinsurers for the period 1960-1990.
For the period 1960-1988, the correlations for five of the seven
reinsurers are significant at the 5 percent level. The effect of
catastrophic losses for reinsurers is likely to be dampened by
combining results of all lines of business. Also, the distorting
effects of interest rate changes on target underwriting profit
margins and external influences on the reinsurance market, such as
tax law changes, dilute the correlation of underwriting profits
with catastrophic losses. The ideal value to measure the
correlation of unexpected catastrophe losses against would be a
company's unexpected property losses for a year. Based on
projected premium volume by line and past property losses, an
insurer or reinsurer could project an expected level of property
insurance losses. The difference between actual losses and the
expected value would represent unexpected losses, and this value
could be positive or negative. Some of the unexpected losses would
result from the level of natural disasters being above or below
normal. This deviation could be hedged by the use of catastrophe
futures. The correlation between the level of natural disasters
and unexpected insurance losses would allow an insurer to develop
an accurate hedge ratio.
Conclusion
Solvency is a prime concern of insurance regulators. The
development of a viable insurance futures contract would provide
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insurers with additional opportunities to reduce the risk of
insolvency. This market may prove as essential for insurance
management as the use of interest rate futures is for banks.
Banking regulators now encourage banks to use interest rate futures
to control their exposure to interest rate shocks.
Some insurers already use financial futures (Hoyt, 1989)
,
although the number is relatively low so far. Reasons for this low
participation probably include both unfamiliarity with these
markets and the lack of appropriate risk reducing mechanisms. The
CBOT ' s insurance futures are unlikely to change this situation.
In this paper an index for an insurance future that avoids the
problems of the CBOT proposal and provides a demonstrated risk
reducing method for insurers is presented. A catastrophe future,
based on an index of insured losses in natural disasters, would
allow insurers to reduce the variability of total profitability.
This index would have an historical record, lower administrative
costs and a higher correlation with profitability than the CBOT
proposal, and also avoid the asymmetric information problem
inherent in the CBOT proposal. Insurance futures are far more
likely to become successful financial innovations if the index were
to be based on an existing value, such as insured catastrophe
losses, than if based on an index generated by a new data
collection process. This preliminary analysis suggests that
catastrophe futures provide a promising hedge for some of the
larger insurance companies and reinsurers.
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TABLE 1
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNEXPECTED NATURAL LOSSES AND UNDERWRITING
PROFIT MARGINS - PRIMARY INSURERS
FIRE INSURANCE
1960-1988 1960-1990
R-squared T-statistic Corr: R-squared T-statistic Corr
STOCKS 0. 1192 -1.912* -0. , 3453 0.0659 -1.431 -0.,2568
MUTUALS 0.0340 -0.975 -0. . 1844 0.0529 -1.273 -0.,2300
STATE FARM 0.0096 -0.512 -0.,0981 0.0278 -0.910 -0.,1666
ALLSTATE 0.0078 -0.460 -0.,0882 0.0088 0.508 0.,0939
AETNA 0.0219 -0.777 -0.,1479 0.3295 -3.775** -0. , 5740
LIBERTY MUTUAL 0.1586 -2.256* -0. , 3982 0.0274 -0.904 -0.,1656
NATIONWIDE 0.0353 -0.994 -0. , 1879 0.0220 -0.808 -0. , 1484
HARTFORD 0.1445 -2. 136* -0.,3802 0.0173 -0.714 -0. , 1314
TRAVELOR'S 0.0080 -0.489 -0.,0936 0.1610 -2.359* -0.,4012
CNA 0.0265 -0.857 -0. , 1627 0.0028 0.283 0.,0525
AMER.-INT'NL 0.0163 -0.670 -0. , 1278 0.1984 -2.679** -0.,4454
* siqnificant at 5% level (one tailed)
** significant at 1% level (one tailed)
ALLIED LINES
1960-1988 1960-1990
R--squared T-statistic : Corr: R-squared T-statistic Corr:
STOCKS 0.4439 -4.642** -0.6662 0.5562 -6.028** -0.7458
MUTUALS 0.2356 -2.885** -0.4854 0.2506 -3. 114** -0.5506
STATE FARM 0.3629 -3.922** -0.6924 0. 1569 -2. 323* -0.3961
ALLSTATE 0. 1361 -1.985* -0. 3690 0.2248 -2 .798** -0.4741
AETNA 0.2965 -3 .373** -0.5445 0.3294 -3 .774** -0.5739
LIBERTY MUTUAL 0. 0062 0.410 0.0786 0.0085 -0.500 -0. 0924
NATIONWIDE 0. 1237 -1.952* -0. 3516 0.1702 -2 .439* -0.4125
HARTFORD 0.0213 -0.767 -0. 1461 0.2181 -2 .844** -0.4670
TRAVELOR'S 0.0776 -1.507 -0.2786 0. 1258 -2. 043* -0.3547
CNA 0. 1315 -2.022* -0.3627 0.0616 -1.380 -0.2482
AMER.-INT'NL 0.2284 -2 .827** -0.4780 0.3573 -4.015** -0.5977
* significant at 5% level (one tailed)
** significant at 1% level (one tailed)
HOMEOWNERS
1960-1988 1960-1990
R-squared T-statistic Corr: R-squared T-statistic Corr:
STOCKS 0.2166 -2.732** -0.,4654 0.3049 -3.567** -0.5522
MUTUALS 0.2859 -3.288** -0..5347 0.1122 -1.915* -0.3350
STATE FARM 0.1854 -2.479** -0.,4306 0.2248 -2.900** -0.4742
ALLSTATE 0. 0836 -1.570 -0.,2892 0.0721 -1.501 -0.2685
AETNA 0.1294 -2.003* -0. , 3597 0.3233 -3.722** -0.5686
LIBERTY MUTUAL 0.0075 -0.451 -0.,0865 0.0581 -1.338 -0.2411
NATIONWIDE 0.0405 -1.067 -0..2012 0.0269 -0.895 -0.1639
HARTFORD 0.1594 -2.263* -0..3993 0.1293 -2.075* -0.3596
TRAVELOR '
S
0.0050 -0.368 -0..0706 0.0162 -0.690 -0.1272
CNA 0.2369 -2.895** -0..4867 0.0778 -1.564 -0.2790
AMER.-INT'NL 0.0291 -0.900 -0..1707 0. 1644 -2.389* -0.4055
* significant at 5% level (one tailed)
** significant at 1% level (one tailed)
COMMERCIAL MULTI-PERIL
1960-1988 1960-1990
R-squared T-statistic Corr: R-squared T-statistic Corr:
STOCKS 0.2152 -2.721** -0..4638 0. , 0637 -1.404 -0.2523
MUTUALS 0. 1458 -2. 147* -0. . 3819 0. , 0293 -0.936 -0.1712
STATE FARM 0. 1707 -2.314* -0,.4132 0..1372 -2.110* -0.3704
ALLSTATE 0.1180 -1.829* -0. . 3435 0.,0099 -0.519 -0.0993
AETNA 0.2057 -2.644** -0..4536 0.,0553 -1.303 -0.2353
LIBERTY MUTUAL 0.0813 -1. 546 -0.,2852 0.,0272 -0.901 -0.1650
NATIONWIDE 0.1112 -1.803* -0. , 3335 0. , 0271 -0.884 -0.1647
HARTFORD 0.0820 -1.553 -0..2865 0.,0436 -1.150 -0.2089
TRAVELOR 0. 1640 -2.301* -0,.4049 0..0499 -1.234 -0.2234
CNA 0.1627 -2.291* -0,.4034 0..0158 -0.682 -0. 1256
AMER.-INT'NL 0.0733 -1.461 -0,.2707 0..0072 0.458 0.0847
* significant at 5% level (one tailed)
** significant at 1% level (one tailed)
TABLE 2
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNEXPECTED NATURAL LOSSES AND UNDERWRITING
PROFIT MARGINS - REINSURERS
1960-1988 1960-1990
R-squared T-statistic Corr: R-squared T-statistic Corr:
GENERAL RE 0.0968 -1.701* -0.3111 0.0002 -0.085 -0.0158
EMPLOYER'S RE 0.0370 -1.018 -0.1923 0.0033 0.308 0.0571
AMERICAN RE 0.1712 -2.362* -0.4138 0.0121 -0.595 -0.1099
SWISS RE 0.2558 -3.047** -0.5058 0.1233 -2.019* -0.0511
MUNICH RE 0.1844 -2.470** -0.4294 0.1098 -1.891* -0.3314
ST. PAUL COS. 0.1293 -2.003* -0.3596 0.0172 -0.713 -0.1312
TRANSATLANTIC- 0.0944 -1.677 -0.3072 0.0353 -1.030 -0.1878
PUTNAM RE
* significant at 5% level (one tailed)
** significant at 1% level (one tailed)
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